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BOOK REVIEW
FOUNDING A SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC
Timothy S. Huebner*
Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson. By Paul
Finkelman.' Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Pp. 296. $64.95.
With this second edition of Slavery and the Founders, a significant
revision of the original work published in 1996, Paul Finkelman does
more to disparage the founding generation than any historian since
Charles A. Beard. Author of An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, published in 1913, Beard argued that
the founders' distinct class interests played a pivotal role in the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution of 1787.2 Because the book
challenged the prevailing nineteenth-century view of the founders as
heroic men who had acted under divine inspiration, Beard's treatise sent
shockwaves across America. Written at the height of the Progressive
Era-while judges, lawmakers, and reformers grappled with issues such
as establishing health and safety regulations for workers, instituting
suffrage rights for women, and generally making government more
accountable to the people-Beard's critique appeared at a time when the
Constitution groaned under enormous strain. Professors, Supreme
Court justices, even presidents publicly discussed the book and its
implications for the policy debates of the day. Like its early twentieth
century counterpart, Finkelman's Slavery and the Founders speaks to
current issues. In our own time, when urban riots, affirmative action,
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Huebner holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Florida (1993) and is the author of
The Southern Judicial Tradition: State Judges and Sectional Distinctiveness, 1790-1890 (U.
Ga. Press 1999) as well as numerous articles on American constitutional and legal history.
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minority voting rights, racial profiling, and reparations for slavery rank
among the important topics of public discussion, Finkelman's incisive
critique of the founding generation's record with regard to African
Americans deserves a wide audience.
In some respects, this book represents the culmination of more
than two decades of scholarship by Professor Finkelman on the
historical relationship between slavery and the American legal system.
In his books, edited volumes, as well as dozens of articles in law reviews
and historical journals, Finkelman has ably demonstrated the centrality
of slavery throughout America's legal development. 3 Although much of
his work over the years has focused on the legal rights of fugitive slaves
in the antebellum North, slavery in the courtrooms of the Old South, and
the records of state appellate judges and United States Supreme Court
justices in slave cases, none of these topics stir debate in the same way
as an examination of slavery and the founders. The men who drafted
the Declaration of Independence and Constitution -though in academic
circles no longer referred to reverentially as "the Founding Fathers"-
remain among the most admired figures in and the most enduring
symbols of the United States. Among constitutional and legal historians,
moreover, "the Founding," particularly the framers' "original intent," still
generates passionate debate.4 Taking account of recent scholarship in
this second edition, Finkelman has extensively rewritten three of the
chapters from the first edition and added a new chapter. Because he
brings his considerable skills and experience as a historian to such a
controversial subject, this book-although much of it has appeared in
print before-is sure to spawn fresh discussion in undergraduate
classrooms as well as the professional academic community.
Finkelman argues that "slavery was a central issue of the American
founding."5 Defining "the founding" and "[flounders" broadly, so as to
include American political and constitutional development from the
3. See Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (U. N.C.
Press 1980); Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of Slavery in American Legal Development, in
Slavery and the Law 3 (Paul Finkelman ed., Madison House Publishers, Inc. 1997). Some
of Finkelman's most important works include: Paul Finkelman, Hooted Down the Page of
History: Reconsidering the Greatness of Chief Justice Taney, 1994 J. S. Ct. Hist. 83; Paul
Finkelman, The Law of Freedom and Bondage: A Casebook (Oceana Publications 1986);
Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment- Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum
North, 17 Rutgers L.J. 415 (1986); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern
State Courts: Anti-Slavery Uses of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 Civil War History 5 (1979); and
Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice
Joseph Story's Judicial Nationalism, 1994 S. Ct. Rev. 247.
4. See generally Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution
(Macmillan & Collier 1988); M. E. Bradford, Original Intentions: On the Making and
Ratification of the United States Constitution (U. Ga. Press 1993); Jack Rakove, Original
Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1996).
5. Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson ix
(2d ed., M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 2001) [hereinafter Slavery and the Founders].
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1780s to the 1820s,6 he begins with an analysis of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. 7 Finkelman draws the title of his first chapter,
"Making a Covenant with Death," from the famous description of the
Constitution by abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison,8 and he echoes
Garrison in contending that the framers created a "proslavery compact."9
Five of the Constitution's provisions, Finkelman claims, "dealt directly
with slavery:" Article I, Section 2 provided that "three-fifths of all slaves"
would be counted "for purposes of representation in Congress;" Article I,
Section 9 addressed slavery both by preventing Congress from banning
the slave trade before the year 1808 and by stating that any "'capitation'
or other 'direct, tax'" be levied based on the census, meaning that three-
fifths of the slave population would be counted; Article IV, Section 2
forbade emancipation of fugitive slaves and required that they "be
returned to their owners;" and Article V prohibited any amendment
affecting the Slave Trade Clause described above.' 0 Several additional
clauses of the Constitution, moreover, "indirectly guarded slavery," he
argues, including the grant of power to Congress to "'suppress
insurrections;'" "the creation of the electoral college," which augmented
southern voting strength; and a ban on federal taxes on exports, which
protected the South's export-producing economy." Although Finkelman
discusses the debates over a few of these provisions,12 particularly the
Three-Fifths Clause, 13 he focuses much of his attention on what he
terms 'The Dirty Compromise" that emerged during the Constitutional
Convention. 14  Commercially minded northern delegates granted
Congress the power to regulate interstate and international commerce,
while pro-slavery southerners received assurance that congressional
control of commerce would exclude the regulation of the slave trade until
1808 and never include the power to tax exports.15
By asserting that slavery "permeated the debates of 1787" and
pervaded the structure of the Constitution in its final form,16 Finkelman
challenges historians who have claimed that the Constitution either took
no position on slavery or leaned toward antislavery. 17 The late Don E.
6. Id. at x
7. See id. at 3-36.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 34-36.
10. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 6-7 (quoting United States
Constitution).
11. Id. at 7-8 (quoting United States Constitution). Here Finkelman's analysis resembles
that of William Wiecek. See William Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constibitionalism in
America, 1760-1848 62-63 (Cornell U. Press 1977).
12. See Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 10-36.
13. See id. at 10-21.
14. Id. at 22-32.
15. See id.
16. Id. atx
17. The most comprehensive examination of the work of the founders does not even
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Fehrenbacher, for example, argued that only three provisions (the Three-
Fifths, Slave Trade, and Fugitive Slave Clauses) of the Constitution "were
directed at" the South's peculiar institution.1 8  None of these,
Fehrenbacher asserted, specifically "authorized" or "forbade" slavery;
instead, these provisions concerned only "certain peripheral features of
the institution."19 Fehrenbacher further pointed out that all of these
clauses referred to the enslaved as "persons," that only one (the Three-
Fifths Clause) "expressly differentiated between free and unfree persons,"
and that none referred to slaves as "property."20 Neglecting to take
account of Fehrenbacher's analysis of the text, Finkelman looks for-
and finds-slavery in nearly every nook and crevice of the Constitution.
Finkelman even contends that some clauses of the Constitution,
although not "considered to affect slavery" at the time they were debated,
"ultimately protected the institution" because of the way in which they
were "interpreted" or "implemented."21  He mentions the Territories
Clause as an example, which the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case
read as giving Congress the power "to protect slavery in the territories
but not to ban the institution" there.22 In making this argument,
Finkelman challenges William Freehling, who views the framers as
essentially antislavery and argues that their work must be evaluated
from a long-term perspective-based on what they hoped and expected
would happen to slavery in the decades after ratification.2 With
southerners in control of the executive branch of the national
government for much of its early history,24 Finkelman shows, the
country's initial development took a decidedly proslavery turn. By his
reckoning, a total of eighteen different clauses, either intentionally or
unintentionally, proved beneficial to slaveholders' interests.25
include the word "slavery" in the index. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787 (U. N.C. Press 1969).
18. Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and
Politics 26 (Oxford U. Press 1978).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 8.
22. Id. at 9.
23. William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 Am. Historical Rev. 81,
92-93 (1972).
24. See Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at X
25. In addition to the five main provisions described above, Finkelman lists U.S. Const.
art I, § 9, cl. 5 (which "prohibited federal taxes on exports"); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2
(which prohibited state taxes on imports and exports); U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (which
provided for an electoral college); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (which allowed for
"admission of new states"); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (which guaranteed that the U.S.
government would protect against "domestic Violence"); U.S. Const. art. V (which required
a three-fourths majority of states to ratify constitutional amendments); U.S. Const. art. I. §
8. cl. 17 (which allowed Congress to regulate institutions in the nation's capital); U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (which limited the right to sue in federal courts to "citizens of
different states"); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (the Full Faith and Credit Clause); U.S. Const. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 1 (the Privileges and Immunities Clause); and U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (the
390 [Vol. 37:387
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Of course, Finkelman has to come to terms with the fact that the
Constitution included neither the word "slavery" nor "slave." He does so
by quoting some of the Convention delegates themselves, who stated
that they avoided such language so as not to antagonize northern
representatives.26  That the Constitution never used these words,
Finkelman argues, mattered not, because "[als long as they were assured
of protection for their institution, the southerners at the Convention
were willing to do without the word 'slave.'"27  But in writing and
interpreting a Constitution, words do matter. The striking absence of
the terms "blacks," "Negroes," and "slaves" from the text-especially in
light of the fact, as Finkelman demonstrates, that delegates freely used
these terms in the course of debate--at least meant that the slavery
question had not been settled in the decisive manner that Finkelman
implies. The omission of such language left room for dissent, and use of
the term "persons" to refer to slaves allowed for the rise of an antislavery
constitutional argument in the early nineteenth century. Because the
United States Constitution's ambiguity on this question permitted a
broad range of opinions, nearly three-quarters of a century later
southerners took a much more intentional approach when they drafted
the Confederate Constitution. As if to acknowledge that the South had
not gotten it right in Philadelphia, in 1861 the Confederate framers re-
wrote the portions of the United States Constitution relating to slavery,
so that their founding charter explicitly guaranteed property in "negro
slaves" and referred specifically to slavery in six different clauses.29
There is, in short, much more significance to the wording of the United
States Constitution with regard to slavery than Finkelman is willing to
admit. Although he presents compelling evidence from the convention
debates that slavery loomed large in 1787, Finkelman fails to offer a fully
convincing explanation of why the founders went through rhetorical
contortions to avoid using the word "slave."
After discussing the Constitutional Convention, Finkelman devotes
the next several chapters of the book to the problem of slavery in the
nation's early political and constitutional development. 30 Contrary to the
claims of most historians, Finkelman asserts, the slavery question
figured prominently in national politics during the three decades
between the Constitutional Convention and the Missouri Crisis of 1819-
Territories Clause). Id. at 7-9.
26. See Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 6.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. Conf. St. Am. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; Conf. St. Am. Const. art. I, § 9, cl 2; Con St.
Am. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; Conf. St. Am. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; Conf. St. Am. Const. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 3; and Conf. St. Am. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 3.
30. See Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 37-128.
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1821.31 He begins with an analysis of the Northwest Ordinance's
prohibition of slavery, a "sacred text" of the antislavery movement in the
antebellum era2 and an important piece of evidence for historians
interested in the founders' views on slavery.33 Finkelman shows, in
chapters on the adoption of the Ordinance and on the persistence of
slavery in two of the states where it had supposedly been banned, that
the 1787 law failed to serve an antislavery purpose.3 4  Instead, he
argues, because "the Ordinance itself was ambiguous, internally
inconsistent, and written by men who were uncertain of their own
objectives," 35 it took sixty years to accomplish final abolition in Illinois. 36
Slave owners in the territories in question believed that the law violated
their property rights, and federal officials failed to enforce the measure.
37
Some Indiana masters continued to hold slaves into the 1830s, while not
until the ratification of the Illinois Constitution of 1848 did that state
finally end slavery.3 8 Although the Ordinance took on an "ideological life
of its own" as a weapon in the antislavery arsenal during the 1840s and
1850s, 39 in practice, Finkelman convincingly demonstrates, the law
proved ineffective in halting the spread of the peculiar institution.4 °
If the Northwest Ordinance virtually failed as antislavery legislation,
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 only confirmed the founding generation's
commitment to preserving slavery. The law grew out of a controversy
involving alleged fugitive slave John Davis of Virginia, whose Virginia
captors faced kidnapping charges in Pennsylvania. 41 The dispute over
the fate of the three Virginians accused of kidnapping culminated in the
passage of federal legislation regulating interstate extradition and the
rendition of fugitive slaves.4 2 Finkelman skillfully outlines the Davis
case and the various versions of the bill that eventually became known
as the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.43 He concludes that passage of the
act ultimately showed that "the founding generation accepted what
historian William Wiecek has called the 'federal consensus' on slavery-
that the national government could not interfere with slavery in the
states and that support for slavery was part of the national compact
31. Id. at 105, 107-09.
32. Id. at 37.
33. See id. at 39.
34. See id. at 37-80.
35. Id. at 39.
36. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 58.
37. Id. at 49-55.
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 84-86.
42. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 89-99.
43. See id. at 84-99.
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necessary to keep the union together."44 On the one hand, in making
this claim, Finkelman buttresses his earlier argument about the
compromise sealed at the Constitutional Convention: northerners and
southerners agreed in conferring constitutional protection upon the
South's peculiar institution.45  On the other hand, though, his
characterization of the Constitution as a pro-slavery compact
undermines the basic argument of the only new chapter in the second
edition, "The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Federalism. " 4 6  Here
Finkelman attempts to prove that slavery served as a defining issue for
the nation's first political parties.47 Examining debates over a variety of
policies -including the Northwest Ordinance, which he surprisingly
uses as evidence for the antislavery views of its supporters-
Finkelman concludes that Democratic-Republicans and Federalists took
contrasting positions on questions relating to slavery and race.49
"Federalists advocated some measure of racial equality," Finkelman
asserts, "in contrast to the Jeffersonians, who fostered the emerging,
racially based, proslavery argument and a concomitant attack on the
rights of free blacks."50 After reading Finkelman's description of the
divisions over slavery that existed between Democratic-Republicans and
Federalists, 51 one cannot help but wonder whether a federal consensus
really existed.
The final two chapters depart from the chronological and thematic
structure of the rest of the book by focusing on America's most revered
founder, Thomas Jefferson. The most familiar of the previously
published portions of this volume, these essays explore the apparent
contradiction between Jefferson's rhetorical commitment to liberty in the
Declaration of Independence and his lifelong devotion to slavery as a
member of the Virginia elite. 52 "Because Jefferson was the author of the
Declaration of Independence and a leader of the American
enlightenment," Finkelman reasons, "the test of his position on slavery is
not whether he was better than the worst of his generation, but whether
he was the leader of the best. . . ."53 Judged against fellow southerners
and revolutionary-era leaders such as George Washington, Colonel John
Laurens, Robert Carter, and Judge St. George Tucker-who either
advocated some form of emancipation, freed substantial numbers of
44. Id. at 103 (quoting Wiecek, supran. 11, at 16).
45. See id. at 3-36.
46. Id. at 105-28.
47. See id.
48. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 107-14.
49. Id. at 108-09.
50. Id. at 109.
51. See id. at 107-28.
52. See id. at 129-96.
53. Id. at 129.
20011 393
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their own slaves, or both 4 -"Jefferson fails the test."55  Finkelman
condemns "the master of Monticello" not only for his unwillingness to act
publicly in any way to help bring about emancipation, but also for his
56personal beliefs and practices with regard to slavery and race. Time
and time again, Finkelman shows, Jefferson refused to exercise his
extraordinary talents and powers to abet the movement for
emancipation.5 7 As author of the Declaration of Independence, member
of the national Congress, Virginia lawmaker and governor, and as
president, Jefferson did nothing to help bring an end to slavery.-8
Moreover, as the owner of 10,000 acres of land and nearly two hundred
bondspersons, Jefferson clung tenaciously to his own slave property. 59
He made a concerted effort to track down those slaves carried off his
plantation by the British during the American Revolution, 6° and he
routinely sold slaves in order to pay off debts to maintain his
61
extravagant lifestyle. Over the course of his lifetime, Jefferson freed
only eight slaves, all of them relatives of Sally Hemmings.6 2 His most
extensive writings on slavery and race relations, contained in his Notes
on the State of Virginia, show that Jefferson held deeply racist views
about blacks and could never get past his fear of the social
consequences of emancipation.6 3 Meticulously researched and soundly
reasoned, Finkelman's discussion takes account of recent DNA evidence
regarding Jefferson and Hemmings, as well as the vast scholarly and
popular literature dealing with Jefferson.64 The result is a compelling
critique of Jefferson and his many admirers.
The discrete nature of the chapters in this book-all but one of
which first appeared as journal articles -hinders Finkelman's ability to
fashion them into a coherent whole. Although he convincingly
demonstrates that the slavery question figured prominently during the
era of the American founding, he falls short in his attempt to prove that
the framers created a "slaveholders' compact. " 65 The framers of the
Constitution did not once and for all establish the meaning of the text
during that hot summer in Philadelphia. On the slavery question-as
with a variety of issues where the language of the text left room for a
diversity of opinions-subsequent Supreme Court justices,
54. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 129-30, 135-36, 146.
55. Id. at 129.
56. See id. at 129-62.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 139-52.
59. Id. at 134.
60. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 141-42.
61. Id. at 131.
62. Id. at 153-54.
63. See id. at 133-34, 150, 160, 180-81, 191.
64. See id. at 163-96.
65. Id. at ix
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congressmen, presidents, and reformers of every stripe imbued the
Constitution with their own ideals. Finkelman demonstrates this very
point when he shows the opposition to slavery expressed by many
Federalists during the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries.66
Later, members of the Liberty and Free Soil Parties, as well as Whigs and
Republicans, developed a powerful antislavery critique that relied on the
nation's founding documents for support. Just as the Northwest
Ordinance's prohibition of slavery north of the Ohio River became a
potent weapon in the arsenal of the antislavery movement, so did the
Declaration of Independence's claim that "all men are created equal" and
the Constitution's Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person "be
deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due -process of law."
Americans debated slavery so vociferously precisely because the
Constitution had not settled the issue.
By arguing that the Constitution definitively sanctioned slavery and
that slavery remained a central issue in American politics, Finkelman
tries to have it both ways: he supports the Garrisonian view of the
Constitution as a "covenant with death" at the same time that he praises
antislavery constitutionalists Salmon P. Chase, Charles Sumner, and
Abraham Lincoln for "challeng[ing] the nation to live up to its ideals."67
Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln, of course, flatly disagreed with Garrison;
they believed that the founders' Constitution stood squarely on the side
of antislavery. At one point in the book, Finkelman himself seems to
agree with antislavery constitutionalists. He devotes several pages to
showing how the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 violated the
Constitution--this after his first chapter argued that the Constitution
directly recognized slavery in five different clauses!69  Such
inconsistencies weaken Finkelman's otherwise compelling case for the
significance of the slavery issue in the early republic.
Despite this shortcoming, Finkelman's Slavery and the Founders
will be the authoritative work on the subject for many years to come. He
devotes careful attention to his primary sources, engages in thoughtful
and reasoned debate with his fellow scholars, and writes in a clear and
engaging manner accessible to experts and laypersons alike. Like the
early twentieth century historian Charles A. Beard, Finkelman brings to
light an unpleasant but important side of America and some its
founders. As the twentieth century began, Beard provided the reading
public with a controversial reappraisal of the work of the nation's
founders at a time when popular movements for social justice and equal
rights shook the very foundations of the American political system. At
66. Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders, supra n. 5, at 107-28.
67. Id. at ix-x
68. See id. at 99-103.
69. Id. at 6-7.
2001l 395
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the dawn of the twenty-first century, when racial and ethnic
demographic changes promise to transform the United States in the near
future, Finkelman's book provides readers with significant information
and insight about how the nation's first generation of leaders confronted
and debated the issue of racial slavery.
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